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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, corporate governance issues have 
received increased attention from various 
international bodies. As highlighted by the Group of 
Thirty (2012), weaknesses in bank corporate 
governance mechanisms are thought to have played 
a vital role during the global financial crisis (GFC) in 
promoting bank risk-taking. The finding that 
corporate governance has implications for bank 
stability was already established long before the 
global financial crisis (Saunders, Strock, & Travlos, 
1990; Gorton & Rosen, 1995; Anderson & 
Fraser, 2000).  
Nevertheless, the global financial crisis brought 
attention, both in academic and policy circles, back 
the role of bank corporate governance structures for 
financial stability. Recent literature investigates the 
impact of corporate governance on bank risk-taking 
(Caprio, Laeven, & Levine, 2007; Laeven & Levine, 
2009; Pathan, 2009; DeYoung, Peng, & Yan, 2013). 
Kirkpatrick (2009) establishes that weak corporate 
governance in banks leads to inadequate risk 
management, especially insufficient risk monitoring 
through the board, a factor that contributed 
significantly to the bank instabilities during the 
crisis. Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2016) show 
that corporate governance arrangements lead to 
actual bank failure. Recent academic work aims at 
identifying the most efficient bank governance 
structures (Adams & Mehran, 2012; Beltratti & Stulz, 
2012; Mehran, Morrison, & Shapiro, 2011). 
Policymakers have tried to address the 
perceived flaws of the existing bank governance 
structures with a series of initiatives to control bank 
risk-taking (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2014; Federal Reserve System et al., 
2010; Liikanen, 2012). They have mainly focused on 
specific governance shortcomings (Srivastav & 
Hagendorff, 2016). In the UK, the Walker Review 
(Walker, 2009) revises board arrangements and the 
qualifications of board members as well as the 
compensation arrangements. Similarly, since 2010 
the Dutch Banking Code addresses the selection 
process of bank boards, including the skill and 
training of board members and their remuneration. 
Guidance for compensation has been released, 
introducing restrictions on salary and perks, and 
disclosure of compensation (Federal Reserve System 
et al., 2010). 
In the European Union (EU), CRD IV (Directive 
2013/36/EU) reinforces the governance 
requirements for banks, highlighting the 
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responsibility of the management body for sound 
governance arrangements, the importance of a 
robust board that challenges and monitors 
management decision-making, and the need to 
establish and implement a sound risk strategy and 
risk management framework.  
Against this background, in this paper we try to 
answer to the following research question: do board 
features, namely the size of the board, the average 
age of its members, and the presence of women 
board members, impact bank risk? As the board of 
directors is the primary governing body of a 
company, it has ultimate responsibility for the 
banks’ business strategy and financial soundness, 
key personnel decisions, internal organisation and 
governance structure and practices, and risk 
management and compliance obligations. Sound 
corporate governance is fundamental to the banks to 
operate well. We thus expect to find an impact of 
board features on the system of risk indicators as 
proposed by the European Banking Authority 
guidelines on the methods for calculating 
contributions to deposit insurance schemes (DIS), 
pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Directive 
2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 (EBA, 2015). Before the 
guidelines’ approval, many member states did not 
have pre-financed DIS. Hence the guidelines set out 
principles for technically sound methods for 
calculating contributions to ensure that costs of 
deposit insurance are borne primarily by the 
banking sector and that the available financial 
means reach the target level within the time horizon 
envisaged in Directive 2014/49/EU. The EBA (2015) 
aim is to provide incentives to banks to operate 
under a less risky business model. To that end, the 
guidelines set out principles on the risk component 
of the calculation method. In addition, they capture 
various aspects of the banks’ risk profile by 
specifying the number of core risk indicators 
pertaining to capital, liquidity and funding, asset 
quality, business model and management, and 
potential losses for the DIS. 
A causal relationship between board features 
and bank risk is, however, difficult to establish. The 
literature has documented that board features are 
not exogenous random variables but are 
endogenously chosen by firms (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003; Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 2016). 
Our estimates may be impacted by omitted variable 
bias and reverse causality. To address endogeneity 
caused by omitted variable bias we use a fixed-
effects model with lagged independent variables. 
Country fixed effects account for unobserved 
country-specific characteristics that are 
time-invariant and may be correlated with the level 
of bank risk. In line with previous literature we find 
evidence that board features affect bank risk; 
specifically, we find that board age has a positive 
impact (Arnaboldi, Casu, Kalothychou, & Sarkisyan, 
2018). We find no evidence that board size and 
board gender composition impact bank risk.  
Our results contribute to the existing literature 
by shedding some light on the impact of board 
features on the contribution of banks to financial 
stability through the risk banks’ add to the deposit 
insurance scheme at the European level. At our 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate 
corporate governance issues as related to deposit 
insurance provisions at European level.  
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
discusses the main variables and presents the 
research methodology. Section 4 presents the 
results, providing for discussion. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Sound governance is relevant in any organisation, 
and it is even more critical in a complex and 
challenging environment as the one banks are facing 
nowadays. Sound governance provides the necessary 
checks and balances; it counters excessive 
risk-taking; it ensures that decisions are taken 
sustainably. 
Since the beginning of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), ECB Banking Supervision has 
developed a comprehensive approach, based on a 
range of tools, to assess the design and 
implementation of sound governance in the 
European banking system (ECB, 2018). A first tool is 
a fit and proper assessment which is employed to 
check whether banks’ board members are suited to 
their position. The Supervisory Authority assesses 
their experience, reputation, independence, their 
time commitment, and their potential conflicts of 
interest to ensure that they are fit and proper for the 
job. Secondly, governance is one of the four central 
elements that constitute the Supervisory Review and 
Evaluation Process (SREP). SREP allows the ECB, and 
the national supervisory authorities for the less 
significant banks, to analyse whether the risks that a 
bank takes are consistent with its risk capacity and 
strategic objectives by assessing banks’ risk appetite 
framework (RAF). In particular, banks should mull 
the policies, processes, controls, systems, and 
procedures defined in their RAF over their decision-
making processes and risk management. The RAF 
should also be aligned with banks’ business plans, 
strategies, capital planning, and remuneration 
schemes. A third tool is the “deep-dive” one, which 
is an on-site mission, which allows the ECB to better 
understand specific processes or approaches related 
to governance and risk assessment, for instance by 
attending board meetings. On-site inspections are a 
fourth tool that is used to discuss governance and 
risk management with banks.  
According to ECB (2018) despite significant 
achievements, banks still need to make 
improvements on: 1) the fit and proper assessments, 
2) boards’ independence, 3) risk appetite 
frameworks, and 4) risk reporting and data 
aggregation. As for the first aspect, the collective 
knowledge of the board can be improved 
strengthening some areas of expertise, such as IT 
and accounting. In this respect, induction 
arrangements and ongoing training are not always 
sufficient to ensure risk awareness and thus foster 
the necessary quality of debate (ECB, 2016). The 
quality of debate on the board, especially its 
capacity to independently challenge the executives, 
is a key element to enhance board independence. 
The quality of debate can be improved working on 
the quality of documentation, on interactions among 
board members and the organisations of board 
meetings. The ECB (2016) highlights various 
shortcomings, for example, that the documentation 
is often not sent sufficiently far in advance, 
information asymmetries among board members can 
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reduce the quality of the debate and the time of 
debate is often too limited. On the design of the 
RAF, several banks, in particular the smaller ones, 
have only recently formalised and integrated the 
framework. Thus areas of improvement are related 
to the full coverage of material risk areas, in 
particular non-financial risks or profitability and 
business risk, and to the proper adjustment of the 
risk appetite metrics to the bank’s business model 
and risk profile. Finally, it is essential that banks 
have effective management information systems to 
be able to report any limit breach adequately and 
promptly. Data aggregation issues impact the quality 
of the risk reports and hamper an effective reporting 
of limit breaches.  
In this paper, we investigate three features of 
the board of directors, as suggested by EBA (2017), 
which relate to the four areas of improvement listed 
above. Board age, board size, and the gender 
composition of the board may both positively or 
negatively contribute to ensuring risk awareness, 
foster the quality of debate, and to board 
independence, which ultimately affects the quality of 
board monitoring and advising functions.  
A second challenge European banks face refers 
to the governance rules applicable in Europe. 
Although various policy initiatives at the EU level 
aimed at improving standards of corporate 
governance, further harmonisation, and supervisory 
convergence are needed to ensuring a level playing 
field. Rules are different among member states; as a 
consequence, banks have to apply national law in 
this area facing higher compliance costs, and greater 
complexity. Besides, the grip of nationalism on 
corporate law shows how governance structures 
matter in ways that surpass the agency cost 
considerations investigated in the literature 
(Pargendler, 2019). Pressures influencing governance 
policies reflect differing views of capital markets 
and corporate purposes between shareholder- and 
stakeholder-oriented systems. For instance, in the 
Netherlands comply-or-explain code works 
reasonably well, assisted by the existence of a 
monitoring capability in this jurisdiction (Dallas & 
Pitt-Watson, 2016). 
Nevertheless, in situations involving controlling 
shareholders, the lack of an enforcement mechanism 
may be a weakness of comply-or-explain. Minimum 
corporate governance standards or stricter 
enforcement laws at the European level might help 
overcome such deficiencies. However, the potential 
risk of attempts for further harmonisation is to 
lower base standards to establish an acceptable 
common denominator across a very diverse group of 
countries with differing governance traditions. In 
this paper, we focus on corporate governance 
arrangements in the Eurozone as affected by the ECB 
regulatory changes. 
 
3.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 . Variables 
 
We initially considered all Eurozone listed 
commercial banks for which accounting and board 
data are available on Orbis Bank Focus, from 2011 to 
2018. The sample spans eight years around the year 
of implementation of the guidelines, that is 2015. 
Due to data availability, the final sample is formed 
by 51 commercial banks in 14 Eurozone countries. 
Appendix 1 reports the list of countries under 
scrutiny. Appendix 2 lists the definition of variables. 
The EBA (2015) guidelines on methods for 
calculating contributions to a DIS are applied to the 
banks under scrutiny. Core and additional indicators 
are computed as proxies of bank risk, which are our 
dependent variables. Indicators belong to one of the 
following risk categories: capital; liquidity and 
funding; asset quality; business model and 
management; potential losses for the DIS. 
 
Core indicators 
 
For the first risk category (capital), the EBA proposes 
two core indicators: leverage ratio, defined as tier 1 
capital to total asset ratio, and capital coverage ratio 
(actual to required CET1 ratio) or common equity 
tier 1 ratio (common equity tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets). Capital indicators reflect the 
level of the loss-absorbing capacity of the bank. 
Higher amounts of capital show that the bank has a 
better ability to absorb losses internally, thus 
decreasing its likelihood of failure. Therefore, banks 
with higher values of capital indicators should 
contribute less to the DIS (EBA, 2015).  
For the liquidity and funding category, the two 
core indicators suggested by the authority (liquidity 
coverage ratio, LCR, and net stable funding ratio, 
NSFR) cannot be applied because, even if their 
definition as determined in Regulation (EU) 
No.575/2013 is fully operational, few data are 
available on Orbis Bank. As a transitional indicator, 
the liquidity ratio (LR) defined as liquid assets to 
total assets is computed. It measures the bank’s 
ability to meet its short-term debt obligations as 
they become due. The higher the ratio, the larger the 
safety margin to meet obligations and unforeseen 
liquidity shortfalls. Indeed, low liquidity levels 
indicate the risk that the institution may be unable 
to meet its current and future, expected or 
unexpected, cash-flow obligations and collateral 
needs.  
The asset quality category shows the extent to 
which the bank is likely to experience credit losses. 
Large credit losses may cause financial problems 
that increase the likelihood of failure, therefore 
justifying higher contributions to the DIS. This 
category includes the non-performing loan (NPL) 
ratio, given by NPLs to total assets. It provides an 
indication of the type of lending the bank engages 
in. A high degree of credit losses in the loan 
portfolio indicates lending to high-risk customers.  
Business model and management takes into 
account the risk related to the bank’s current 
business model and strategic plans and reflects the 
quality of internal governance and controls. Business 
model indicators can, for instance, include 
indicators related to profitability, balance sheet 
development, and exposure concentration. The first 
core indicator proposed by the EBA is risk-weighted 
assets to total assets ratio, which indicates the kind 
of risky activities a bank engages in. A higher value 
indicates a higher risk. A second core indicator is 
return on asset (ROA). A business model that is able 
to generate high and stable returns indicates lower 
risk. However, unsustainably high levels of ROA also 
indicate higher risk (EBA, 2015).  
The last risk category is potential losses for the 
DIS. The EBA (2015) suggests one core indicator 
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(unencumbered assets to covered deposits), which 
measures the degree of expected recoveries from the 
bankruptcy estate of the bank, which was resolved 
or put into normal insolvency proceedings. A bank 
with a low ratio exposes the DIS to the higher 
expected loss. However, the proposed definition of 
the unencumbered asset does not allow the ratio to 
be computed with data currently available.1 
 
Additional indicators 
 
In addition to the core risk indicators, DISs may 
include additional risk indicators that are relevant 
for determining the risk profile of member banks. 
The additional risk indicators should be classified 
into the above-listed risk categories. The EBA 
proposes indicators for the asset quality, business 
model, and management and potential losses for the 
DIS categories. In this empirical investigation, three 
additional indicators belonging to the business 
model and management category are applied: 
1) excessive balance sheet growth ratio (total asset 
growth – TAG), which measures the growth rate of 
the bank’s balance sheet. Unsustainably high growth 
might indicate higher risk; 2) return on equity (ROE), 
which measures the ability to generate profits to 
shareholders from the capital these have invested in 
the bank. A business model that is able to generate 
high and stable returns indicates a reduced 
likelihood of failure. However, unsustainably high 
levels of ROE indicate higher risk; 3) cost to income 
ratio (CI) which measures cost efficiency. An 
unusually high ratio may indicate that the 
institution’s costs are out of control, especially if 
represented by the fixed costs (that is, higher risk). 
A very low ratio may indicate that operating costs 
are too low for the institution to have the required 
risk and control functions in place, also indicating 
higher risk (EBA, 2015).  
Overall this paper considers seven out of nine 
core indicators and three out of 13 additional 
indicators.  
 
Individual risk score 
 
As is normal practice, the EBA proposes thresholds, 
classes, and weights to compute individual bank risk 
scores (IRS). The EBA allows two methods to assign 
banks to risk classes: the bucket method and the 
sliding method. The first one uses a fixed number of 
buckets defined for each risk indicator by setting 
upper and lower boundaries for each bucket. The 
number of buckets for each risk indicator should be 
at least two. The buckets should reflect different 
levels of risk posed by the member banks (for 
example, high, medium, low risk) assessed on the 
basis of particular indicators (EBA, 2015). Where the 
calculation method follows the sliding scale 
approach instead of a fixed number of risk classes, 
the upper and lower limits are set by the DIS on the 
basis of regulatory requirements or historical data 
on the particular indicator. Since the sliding method 
is based on information available only to the 
national DIS, this empirical investigation employs 
the bucket method. 
                                                          
1 EBA defines unencumbered and encumbered assets as the following: “an 
asset should be treated as encumbered if it has been pledged or it is subject to 
any form of arrangement to secure, collaterise or credit-enhance any on-
balance sheet or off-balance sheet transaction from which it cannot be freely 
withdrawn (for instance, to be pledged for funding purposes)” (EBA, 2015, 
p. 22). 
Bucket method 
 
In the bucket method, an IRS is assigned to each 
bucket. The buckets’ boundaries should be 
determined either on a relative or absolute basis. 
When using a relative basis, the IRS of banks 
depends on their relative risk position vis-à-vis other 
institutions; in this case, institutions are distributed 
evenly between risk buckets, meaning that 
institutions with similar risk profiles may end up in 
different buckets. In the absolute basis, the buckets’ 
boundaries are determined to reflect the riskiness of 
a specific indicator; in this case, all banks may end 
up in the same bucket if they all have a similar level 
of riskiness.  
For each risk indicator, the IRS assigned to 
buckets should range from zero to 100, where zero 
indicates the lowest risk and 100 the highest risk. To 
compute the IRS of the sample banks, buckets, and 
boundaries provided by the EBA have been used for 
the NPL ratio, ROA, ROE, and TAG. The EBA does not 
provide specific examples for the leverage ratio, 
CET1, LR, RWA to total assets (TA), and 
cost-to-income ratio, thus relative boundaries, which 
correspond to the 20, 40 and 60th percentile of the 
sample banks distribution year-to-year, have been 
used for those indicators. The percentiles and 
corresponding IRS have been fixed according to EBA 
guidelines. Relative boundaries imply an even 
distribution of banks among risk buckets. 
 
Aggregate risk score 
 
The EBA (2015) multiplies each IRS by an indicator 
weight (IW), which should be the same for all banks 
and calibrated by using supervisory assessment 
and/or historical data on failures of institutions 
(EBA, 2015).  
The sum of weights assigned to all risk 
indicators is equal to 100 percent. When assigning 
weights to particular risk indicators, the minimum 
weights for the risk categories and core risk 
indicators, which sum up to 75 per cent, should be 
preserved. EBA (2015) shows the weights assigned to 
risk indicators when only core indicators are 
computed and NSFR is not yet available and states 
that the minimum IW assigned to NSFR is assigned 
to LR, which belongs to the same risk category.  
The aggregate risk score (ARS) is the weighted 
average of the IRS, according to the following 
formula: 
 
      ∑        
 
   
 (1) 
 
where, ∑         
 
    and            when X in 
{       }, i.e. the bucket corresponding to 
indicator   . 
In this paper, the IWs applied to core indicators 
are the ones presented EBA (2015).2 Consequently, 
when only core indicators are investigated, the ARS 
is computed according to: 
 
                                                          
2 As previously mentioned, the ratio of unencumbered assets to covered 
deposits has not been computed because data on unencumbered assets for the 
sample banks are not available. Thus, the weight (17 per cent) originally 
assigned by the EBA to this ratio is equally allocated among all other 
computed indicators. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 17, Issue 4, Summer 2020 (Special Issue) 
 
250 
                                                              
                       
(2) 
 
When core and additional indicators are considered, equation (3) applies: 
 
                                                                                
                                            
(3) 
 
        is the proxy for bank risk used as the 
main dependent variable.                    is used 
as an alternative measure for bank risk.  
 
Independent variables 
 
Many of the post-crisis governance reforms explicitly 
emphasise that diversity on board would positively 
affect the governance of companies. 
Directive 2013/36/EU recommends that diversity is 
one of the criteria for the composition of boards and 
should also be addressed in banks’ recruitment 
policy more generally. EBA (2017) considers age a 
key aspect of diversity, as the period in which a 
person has grown up influences his or her values, 
skills, experiences, social networks, and risk culture. 
By increasing the age diversity of the board of 
directors, the board’s aggregated human and social 
capital can be maximised with a positive impact on 
performance (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 
2010). On the other hand, Westphal and Zajac (1995) 
argue that CEOs prefer to work with 
demographically similar board directors. Thus, CEOs 
who can influence the directors’ nomination process 
will try to hire directors who are demographically 
similar to themselves. Furthermore, member states 
show different demographical structures, which may 
affect the age of board members. To this extent, the 
supervisory authority encourages selecting board 
members of different ages to enhance board 
effectiveness. We, therefore, test the average board 
members’ age as an independent variable, taking its 
natural logarithm (AGE). 
Board size is a second feature that may impact 
board independence and the quality of the debate. 
Larger boards may strive at reaching consensus as 
several different opinions have to be reconciled. 
However, smaller boards can more easily follow the 
CEO’s lead and be more entrenched. In the financial 
services industry, the results on the relationship 
between board size and performance are mixed; 
possible explanations refer to regulatory issues, 
informational asymmetries, and organisational 
structure (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; 
Adams & Mehran, 2003, 2012; Boone, Casares Field, 
Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; De Andrés & Vallelado, 
2008; Cheng, 2008; Harris & Raviv, 2008; Linck, 
Netter, & Yang, 2008).To test whether larger boards 
impact bank risk-taking, we consider the natural 
logarithm of the size of the board of directors (SIZE). 
We finally study the presence of women on 
board. One argument is that gender balance is of 
particular importance to ensure adequate 
representation of population and directors should 
be selected among a greater pool of talents. Despite 
a general call for greater diversity, EBA (2017) shows 
that in most member states, a relatively low number 
of banks have adopted a diversity policy. Most 
frequently, banks do not indicate a timeline within 
which they intend to achieve diversity targets. 
Evidence suggests that soft law regulation aimed at 
improving the participation of women and 
minorities in high profile roles have had little 
impact. Therefore, several European regulators 
recommend gender quotas for publicly listed 
companies’ boards. We consider the presence of 
women (WOM) on bank boards as our third 
explanatory variable.  
To mitigate the effect of correlated omitted 
variable bias, we control for a set of bank-level 
characteristics that are typically related to bank 
performance (Kanagaretnam, Lim, & Lobo, 2014; 
Garcia-Meca, Garcia-Sanchez, & Martinez-Ferrero, 
2015; Arnaboldi, Casu, Kalothychou, & Sarkisyan, 
2018). Specifically, we include bank size measured 
by the natural logarithm of total assets. We also 
control for the possible effect of bank growth on 
performance by including total asset growth. Next, 
we control for asset composition using the loan to 
total assets ratio and for the quality of the loan 
portfolio using the loan loss provision ratio. We 
control for funding sources by including the deposit 
and short-term funding to total assets ratio. We 
account for the impact of capital on bank 
performance by including the capital to total assets 
ratio. Finally, we control for the bank operating 
efficiency proxied by the cost to income ratio. 
 
3.2. Model 
 
To test whether bank board features impact bank 
risk, proxied by aggregate risk scores, we use the 
following fixed effects model: 
 
                                                                (4) 
 
where       refers to the aggregate risk score (core 
and core+additional) of bank i in year t,        is a 
matrix containing the k board features,        is a 
matrix containing the m bank control variables. We 
estimate the (1 + k + m) coefficient vector      . 
The error term            is assumed to be 
independent from the k board-specific regressors 
and the m bank-specific controls. The noise     is 
assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed, whereas the time-invariant component 
   represents unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity. The model employs time and country 
fixed effects which help to mitigate to some extent 
biases caused by omitted variables correlated with 
the independent variables. The use of lagged 
independent variables also alleviates some of the 
endogeneity concerns. 
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4. RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
4.1. Univariate analysis 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample 
banks. Bank boards are formed by 17 members on 
average, of which 22 per cent are women. The 
average age is 59 years. Banks under scrutiny are 
commercial banks, which finance 70 per cent of total 
assets through deposits and invest 59 per cent in 
loans. As for bank risk, the total asset growth is one 
per cent, well below the pre-global financial crisis 
level. Equity to total assets equals seven per cent 
and the ratio of provisions to loans is one per cent. 
The average cost to income ratio is 64 per cent.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
ARSc 290 56.88 16.13 4.95 100.00 
ARSca 290 58.09 13.75 19.80 93.28 
Board variables 
Size 290 16.80 6.18 7.00 41.00 
Age 290 59.21 4.73 35.80 70.38 
Wom 290 0.22 0.12 0.00 0.53 
Bank-specific variables 
Bank size 258 25.23 1.80 21.16 28.36 
Total asset growth 255 0.01 0.12 -0.28 0.66 
Loans to total assets 258 0.59 0.19 0.10 0.87 
Total deposits to total assets 257 0.70 0.13 0.35 0.92 
Equity to total assets 258 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.15 
Loan loss provisions to loans 257 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 
Cost to income 254 0.64 0.15 0.32 1.24 
Note: Bank specific variables are winsorized at 99 per cent. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
The aggregate risk score may depend on past 
bank features. In this respect, differences may exist 
among Southern and Northern Eurozone countries 
(Southern European countries in our sample are 
Cyprus, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Malta and 
Portugal). We, therefore, test the difference in means 
of the core and core-plus additional aggregate risk 
scores among Southern and Northern European 
countries. Table 2 reports the results. 
 
Table 2. Difference in means 
 
  Souther Eurozone countries Norther Eurozone countries   
No. of obs. Mean No. of obs. Mean Difference in means 
ARSc 192 61.26 99 48.15 13.10627*** 
ARSca 192 61.81 98 50.82 10.98008*** 
Note: The table reports the summary statistics (number of observations, mean, and difference in means) for the aggregate risk 
scores used in the analysis for Southern and Northern Euro. The t-statistics for the mean differential are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
Banks incorporated in Southern Eurozone 
countries report higher bank risk measured both by 
core and core-plus additional aggregate risk scores 
than banks in Northern Eurozone countries (61 
versus 48 and 62 versus 51, respectively). The result 
confirms that differences are still relevant among 
Eurozone countries in terms of bank risk, and these 
differences may be partly due to differences in 
board structures. 
Appendix 3 reports the correlation matrix. 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
 
The regression results of the models in equation (4) 
that investigate the impact of board features on 
bank aggregate risk scores as defined by EBA (2015) 
are shown in Table 3. In column (1), we examine the 
effect of board features on core aggregate risk score 
         , in columns (2) we add the gender 
composition, and in column (3) and (4) we replace 
the core aggregate risk score with the core and 
additional aggregate risk score                     . 
All specifications use bank-specific control variables 
and account for time- and country-specific fixed 
effects. 
We find that among board features, board age 
(AGE) is positively related to both core and core-plus 
additional aggregate risk scores, suggesting that 
more senior boards increase bank risk. Although the 
relationship between board age and firm 
performance is unclear, our result is in line with the 
strand of literature that posits that older boards 
show more entrenched views and can also signal 
lower board dynamism (Schleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Board age had an increasing effect on bank risk 
during the Eurozone crisis (Arnaboldi, Casu, 
Kalothychou, & Sarkisyan, 2018). Boards with similar 
demographics can be prone to group thinking and 
therefore be less efficient in their monitoring 
function, for instance aligning their compensation to 
(higher) CEO compensation (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). 
With a larger age diversity, the board’s aggregated 
human and social capital can be maximised (Carter, 
D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010), if the 
assumption that demographically different directors 
will hold differing perspectives is verified (Li & 
Wahid, 2017).  
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Table 3. Fixed effects model with lagged independent variables 
 
  ARSc ARSc ARSca ARSca 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Size -2.7479 -2.7386 -2.0303 -2.2185 
 
(-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.67) (-0.71) 
Age 33.0848*** 33.0920*** 18.7138* 18.5680* 
 
(2.86) (2.84) (1.83) (1.81) 
Wom 
 
0.2862 
 
-5.7966 
  
(0.03) 
 
(-0.63) 
Bank size 1.7708 1.7662 1.3978 1.4892 
 
(1.51) (1.45) (1.43) (1.49) 
Total asset growth -0.2229 -0.2379 -5.4254 -5.1216 
 
(-0.04) (-0.04) (-1.14) (-1.07) 
Loans to total assets 37.8552*** 37.8104*** 26.1701*** 27.0781*** 
 
(6.63) (6.26) (5.17) (5.16) 
Total deposits to total assets -12.0821 -12.0342 -11.8059 -12.7746 
 
(-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.17) (-1.26) 
Equity to total assets -95.9388** -95.8742** -88.1016** -89.4096** 
 
(-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.45) (-2.48) 
Loan loss provisions to loans -48.4393 -48.8142 -54.2278 -46.6343 
 
(-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.65) (-0.54) 
Cost to income 16.4910** 16.5043** 23.4362*** 23.1676*** 
  (2.44) (2.44) (3.84) (3.79) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 269 269 269 269 
Adjusted R-squared 0.624 0.622 0.568 0.568 
Note: The table reports the main regression results of the effects of board features on bank aggregate risk scores (core and 
core+additional). Model 1 presents the results for the effects of bank board features on its core aggregate risk score; Model 2 adds the 
board gender composition; Model 3 presents the results for the effects of bank board features on its core and additional aggregate risk 
score; Model 4 adds the board gender composition. The models control for bank-specific characteristics, country fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. All independent variables are lagged by 
one period. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
Board size and the presence of women on the 
other hand are not related to aggregate risk scores. 
As for board size, our result is in line with the 
previous literature which has uncovered a U-shaped 
relationship between board size and performance. 
De Andrés and Vallelado (2008) show that larger 
boards create more value; however, this relationship 
is non-monotonic and when the board reaches a 
certain size, the firm value decreases. Arnaboldi 
Casu, Kalothychou, and Sarkisyan (2018) show that 
board size does not impact bank risk, measured as 
performance variability, but larger boards bring a 
performance benefit that is non-linear and only 
documented when the board size is bigger than 
average.  
The presence of women on boards has been 
strongly encouraged on the view that boards should 
not exclude female talents and that women are less 
entrenched and more independent than men. 
However, the effect of gender diversity on 
performance is mixed (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Dezso & Ross, 2011; Garcia-Meca, Garcia-Sanchez, & 
Martinez-Ferrero, 2015). Arnaboldi, Casu, 
Kalothychou, and Sarkisyan (2018) find no impact of 
gender diversity on bank performance. Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) use the mandatory introduction of 
gender quotas in Norwegian listed firms as a natural 
experiment to analyse the impact of quota on firm 
valuation. The authors find a large negative impact 
of the mandated board changes on firm value, 
because younger and less experienced members 
enter the board, thus reducing the effectiveness of 
the board. In the same case, Garcia-Lara, 
Penalva-Zuasti, and Scapin (2017) find that the 
changes in monitoring are not primarily driven by 
the introduction of a gender quota, but by changes 
in the professional characteristics of board 
members, such as experience and age. 
The estimated coefficients on the bank control 
variables exhibit the expected signs. The share of 
total assets invested in loans is positively related to 
bank risk (Loans to total assets). A larger loan 
portfolio is linked to a higher risk, ceteris paribus. 
Similar results are found for the cost to income 
ratio: lower efficiency is related to higher risk. On 
the other hand, the equity to total assets ratio shows 
a negative and statistically significant association 
with bank risk as expected, since equity works as a 
cushion protecting stakeholders if the bank 
experiences heavy losses.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In the last few years, the Eurozone banking sector 
has continued to reduce its level of risk, benefitting 
from the positive macroeconomic developments in 
most euro area countries and from the 
implementation of several reforms both at the EU 
and national levels. We empirically investigate the 
level of risk of a sample of listed commercial 
Eurozone banks by employing the monitoring 
system of bank riskiness proposed by the EBA 
(2015) and by applying risk indicators, scores, and 
weights and we relate it to banks board features. The 
average age of board members, board size, and the 
fraction of women on board are considered. Whereas 
board age has a positive impact on bank risk, board 
size and the presence of women do not seem to 
impact EBA scores. Although our results are in line 
with the previous literature, as more data become 
available, the sample size could be enlarged. In 
addition, alternative models should be tested to 
better control for endogeneity.  
Our evidence supports recent policy initiatives 
aiming to foster board diversity, encouraging the 
appointment of members from different 
backgrounds. It implies the relevance of the average 
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age of the board of directors on its decision process, 
on board independence, and the quality of the 
debate. As older boards appear to be risk enhancing, 
the regulator should take the average age of the 
board, and not only its variability, in careful 
consideration.  
Our results also shed a light on the relevance of 
the methods for calculating risk-based contributions 
to national DIS, which should properly address the 
characteristics of the national banking sectors and 
business models of banks with the goal to reduce 
the potential losses stemming from a DIS 
intervention by adequately reflecting the likelihood 
of the bank’s failure. A wider set of indicators may 
help to calibrate contributions to each country’s 
banking system specificity.  
The EBA (2015) guidelines were incorporated in 
the domestic supervisory processes and procedures 
by the end of 2015, with the exception of Latvia, 
Poland, and Finland. From that date on, and in any 
case no later than by 31 May 2016, contributions to 
be raised by national DISs comply with these 
guidelines, de facto creating national deposit 
insurance schemes working under the same 
European rules. 
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APPENDIX 1. SAMPLE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
 
Country Number of banks 
Austria 5 
Belgium 2 
Cyprus 2 
Germany 3 
Spain 6 
Finland 2 
France 8 
Greece 4 
Ireland 2 
Italy 12 
Lithuania 1 
Malta 1 
Netherlands 1 
Portugal 2 
 
APPENDIX 2. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Risk variables 
ARSc Core aggregate risk score  
Authors’ calculation using EBA (2015) and Orbis 
Bank Focus data 
ARSca Core and additional risk score 
Authors’ calculation using EBA (2015) and Orbis 
Bank Focus data 
Board variables 
SIZE Board size = Number of board members Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
AGE 
Board age = Average age of board 
members (years) 
Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
WOM Fraction of women on the board Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
Bank-specific variables 
TA Total assets (Euro billions) Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
TAGA Total asset growth Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
LOANTA Loan ratio = Gross loans to total assets Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
TDTA 
Deposit ratio = Deposit and short-term 
funding to total assets 
Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
ETA Equity to total assets Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
LLPLOAN 
Quality of loan portfolio = Loan loss 
provisions to gross loans 
Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
CI Cost to income ratio (%) Authors’ calculation using Orbis Bank Focus data 
Note: The table defines the variables used in the study and the source of the data. 
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APPENDIX 3. CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
ARSc ARSca Size Age Wom 
Bank 
size 
Total 
asset 
growth 
Loans to 
total 
assets 
Total 
deposits 
to total 
assets 
Equity to 
total 
assets 
Loan loss 
provisions 
to loans 
Cost to 
income 
ARSc 1 
           
ARSca 0.9637* 1 
          
Size 0.1834* 0.1848* 1 
         
Age 0.2631* 0.2148* 0.1342* 1 
        
Wom -0.0695 -0.0678 0.1750* 0.1685* 1 
       
Bank size 0.1069 0.1420* 0.3573* 0.1922* 0.3184* 1 
      
Total asset growth -0.067 -0.045 -0.0805 0.015 0.0789 -0.1890* 1 
     
Loans to total assets 0.5606* 0.4724* 0.0526 0.2583* -0.1124 -0.2641* -0.0716 1 
    
Total deposits to total assets 0.0705 0.0134 -0.2878* -0.0461 -0.2860* -0.6623* 0.1703* 0.3726* 1 
   
Equity to total assets -0.1837* -0.2241* -0.0613 0.0989 -0.0833 -0.4888* 0.044 0.2809* 0.4672* 1 
  
Loan loss provisions to loans 0.6204* 0.6279* -0.0438 0.0378 -0.2306* -0.0956 -0.114 0.4167* 0.2220* 0.0407 1 
 
Cost to income -0.0311 0.1094 0.1247* -0.0559 0.1561* 0.2075* -0.1856* -0.1773* -0.2699* -0.1887* 0.0304 1 
Note: Board size, board age and bank size are taken in natural logarithm. Bank specific variables are winsorized at 99 per cent. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
